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SORENSON RESEARCH COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20395 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Absent an express contract of employment for a 
specified duration, does Utah recognize a cause 
of action for the alleged "wrongful" termination 
of an employee? 
(b) Absent direction from the Utah legislature, 
should this court overturn substantial Utah case 
law precedent which denies a cause of action for 
alleged "wrongful" termination of an employee? 
(c) Absent an express contract of employment for a 
specified duration, should this court judicially 
impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing into the employment relationship and 
thereby abrogate the terminable-at-will doctrine 
in Utah, 
(d) Absent an express contract of employment for a 
specified duration, should this court restrict an 
employer's right to terminate employees only in 
accordance with an employer's unbargained for and 
unilateral employee handbook. 
(e) Does Utah's Employment Relations and Collective 
Bargaining Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-1 (1953), 
as amended, restrict a non-union employer's right 
to terminate an employee at will? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant Becky Lowe ("Plaintiff") brought 
this action against her former employer, Defendant-Respondent 
Sorenson Research Company, Inc., ("Sorenson") for the alleged 
"wrongful" termination of her employment. Plaintiff's 
Complaint alleged four separate causes of action against 
Sorenson, including breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, breach of an implied duty to deal in good 
faith as allegedly imposed by Sorenson's employee handbook, and 
breach of implied duty to deal in good faith pursuant to Utah's 
Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining Act. (R. 2-7) 
Despite plaintiff's assertion in its Brief to the contrary, all 
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of these Counts, with the exception of Count III for damages 
for breach of public policy, are based in contract. (R. 2-7) 
They involve alleged breach of implied contractual covenants 
which plaintiff attempts to insert into a terminable-at-will 
employment relationship* 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's 
Complaint on the grounds it failed to state a cause of action. 
(R. 11-26) After the submission of briefs and oral argument 
the lower court denied Sorenson's initial Motion to Dismiss, 
without prejudice, to permit plaintiff to conduct discovery to 
determine if a written contract of employment existed. (R. 49, 
53-54) Sorenson was not required to file an answer to 
plaintiff's Complaint and was free to renew its Motion to 
Dismiss at the end of the specified discovery period. (R. 49, 
53-54) After the discovery, which included the production of 
plaintiff's employee file and the depositions of Sorenson's 
personnel manager, production manager and supervisor, (R. 
50-52, 55-59) Plaintiff's discovery confirmed the 
non-existence of an employment contract and established the 
employment relationship as one terminable-at-will (Plaintiff's 
Brief at 3). Sorenson's Motion to Dismiss was reheard before 
the lower court, and the court granted Sorenson's Motion to 
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Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint as to all counts. (R. 85, 92-93) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although this court on review should survey the facts 
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 
Utah 2d 207, 398 P.2d 204 (1965), Sorenson does not admit any 
of the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint as true. Nor are 
the facts, other than the non-existence of an employment 
contract, necessary or relevant to this appeal, since plaintiff 
asks this court to create new law. This appeal asks this court 
only to review the long established Utah case law precedent 
concerning the terminable-at-will doctrine. Plaintiff 
sustained injuries in an automobile accident wholly unrelated 
to her employment and received health and accident benefits 
from Sorenson for eight months before she returned to work. 
(R. 3) If Sorenson had been required to answer plaintiff's 
Complaint, it would have noted that plaintiff was terminated 
from her employment because she had been absent without leave 
from her employment after she had returned to work from the 
rehabilitation from her accident and her termination was in 
accordance with Sorenson1s procedures for termination of such 
an employee absent without leave for more than three 
consecutive days. (R. 90) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Through a long line of cases, Utah has 
consistently recognized that an employment for an unspecified 
time constitutes a terminable-at-will relationship which may be 
terminated by either the employer or employee without notice or 
cause. Thus, an employee hired for an indefinite time has no 
right of action against the employer for breach of an 
employment contract. This law governs this case and is 
supported by a majority of states, and should continue as the 
law in the state of Utah. 
II. The Supreme Court of Utah has never recognized an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an 
employment contract and should not do so in this case. The 
insertion of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a 
terminable-at-will relationship is absolutely inappropriate, 
since it would directly contradict the terminable-at-will 
doctrine which permits an employer or employee to quit or be 
terminated at any time and for any cause. A majority of courts 
which have addressed this issue have expressly rejected it. 
The grounds for such rejection are sound and the application of 
an implied covenant restricting the right of termination would 
negate the terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah. Additionally, 
such implied covenants may only be read into express contracts 
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to aid or further other terms of the contract, and as such are 
merely derivative of express terms of a contract and have no 
independent existence. Thus, an implied covenant is not 
appropriate in a terminable-at-will relationship since it is 
contradictory to the very terms of the employment contract. 
Utah case law has also impliedly rejected this argument in the 
context of an employment relationship. 
III. An employer's statements or policies and 
procedures set forth in employee manuals or booklets do not 
restrict an employer's right to terminate an employee at will. 
Employee manuals or policy statements have been recognized by 
the courts of numerous states as mere unilateral statements of 
position, unbargained for between employer and employee, which 
do not create enforceable contract rights. Furthermore, in 
this case Sorenson's employee handbook does not restrict 
Sorenson's right to terminate at will. 
IV. Absent an express statutory delineation of public 
policy restricting Sorenson's right to terminate its employees 
at will, the general rule of termination-at-will applies. No 
such public policy exists here, and plaintiff's reliance on 
Utah's Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining Act to 
imply covenants of good faith and fair dealing is misplaced and 
the Act is inapplicable here. 
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V. The recognition of public policy and the 
balancing of the rights of the employer and the employee are 
matters within the domain of the Legislature and best 
accomplished by the Legislature. The Legislature has already 
limited an employer's right to terminate its employees in 
several areas, and without an express mandate from the 
Legislature, this court should not adopt the extremely broad 
exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine that plaintiff 
urges on this court. 
VI. The terminable-at-will doctrine, as presently 
recognized in the State of Utah, serves important public policy 
interests. The doctrine not only provides certainty in the 
work place and decreases the incidence of vexatious litigation, 
but also facilitates economic growth and stability. These 
important public interests strongly support the continued 
vitality of Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE NO CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CAN BE MAINTAINED IN UTAH 
ABSENT AN EXPRESS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
Plaintiff's claim against Sorenson for alleged 
wrongful termination of employment asks this court to 
completely disregard the well established rule that a general 
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or indefinite hiring, for an unspecified time constitutes a 
"terminable-at-will" relationship which may be terminated by 
either the employer or employee at any time, without notice or 
cause. This general rule of law is the law in Utah. This 
court, in a long line of cases has consistently declared that 
employment contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at 
the will of either party, at any time and for any reason. See, 
e.g., Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 
P.2d 210 (1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960) ("Absent a specified length 
of time of employment, it is generally recognized that under 
such a provision either party may terminate the employment at 
will."). Accord, Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1970) 
("In the absence of a contract for a definite term, an employee 
may quit whenever he desires, the same as an employer may fire 
him.") . 
In Held, this court, in reversing the district court1s 
refusal to grant defendant American Linen's Motion to Dismiss, 
quoted the applicable rule as follows: 
In the absence of something in the contract 
of employment to fix a definite term of 
service, or other contractual provision to 
restrict the right of the employer to 
discharge, or some statutory restriction 
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upon this right, an employer may lawfully 
discharge an employee at what time he 
pleases and for what cause he chooses, 
without thereby becoming liable to an action 
against him. A general contract of hiring 
is ordinarily deemed a contract terminable 
at the will of either the employer or the 
employee. (Emphasis added) 
307 P.2d at 211-12. 
Again, in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 
1979) (emphasis added), this court reiterated this general 
rule, declaring: 
In the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of 
the employment or of a good consideration in 
addition to the services contracted to be 
rendered, the contract is no more than an 
indefinite, general hiring which is 
terminable at the will of either party, . . . 
When an individual is hired for an 
indefinite time, he has no right of action 
against his employer for breach of the 
employment contract upon being discharged. 
This court's application of the "terminable-at-will" 
doctrine has been followed by federal judges applying Utah law 
to dismiss claims for wrongful termination brought by persons 
formerly employed under contracts of indefinite duration. See, 
e.g., Heward v. Western Electric Co., P.2d , 116 BNA 
L.R.R.M. 3423, 3425 (10th Cir. 1984) ("It is essential under 
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Utah law that in order to modify an employer's right to 
terminate an at-will employee, there must be some 'further 
express or implied stipulation1 as to the duration of 
employment."); Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. 
Supp 791 (D. Utah 1984).-' In Amos, Judge Winder rejected 
the plaintiff's contention that the District Court should 
follow the minority decisions that have created exceptions to 
the terminable-at-will doctrine. The plaintiffs in Amos 
claimed that their claims should be allowed because the 
terminations allegedly violated "compelling national policy 
against religious discrimination." In rejecting this argument, 
Judge Winder stated: 
Although this court has the duty and power 
to mold the laws of this state when applying 
uncertain state law, it may not change 
existing state law. The plaintiffs argue 
that none of the Utah cases that defendants 
cite is dispositive because in none of the 
cases v/as the Utah Supreme Court asked to 
recognize a wrongful discharge cause of 
action. However, the long history of the 
Utah Supreme Court's recognition of the 
terminable-at-will doctrine, the language 
the court has used in dismissing those cases 
and the failure of the court to even suggest 
that it might recognize an exception to that 
i/ In this case the individual plaintiffs brought 
suit for wrongful discharge against two wholly owned 
corporation soles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
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rule lead this court to the conclusion that 
the recognition of an exception to the 
terminable-at-will doctrine would be a 
change in Utah law. 
Id. at 829-30. (Emphasis added) [citations omitted]. 
Accordingly, in Utah, an employer's right to terminate 
a terminable-at-will relationship is unimpaired, except as set 
forth in express provisions of an employment contract or as 
restricted by statute. Plaintiff has acknowledged the 
non-existence of an express contract of employment and admits 
that the employment was of indefinite duration and subject to 
the terminable-at-will rule. (Plaintiff's Brief p. 3, 33) 
Thus, even accepting all of plaintiff's allegations as true for 
the purpose of this appeal, plaintiff's Complaint fails to 
state a claim against Sorenson upon which relief can be 
granted. Accordingly, the lower court's decision in dismissing 
plaintiff's Complaint should be affirmed. 
In order to avoid the effect of the Utah law, 
plaintiff argues that this court should create new law, in 
i/(con't) Saints ("the Mormon Church"). The 
individuals were terminated from their employment with the 
church-owned corporations because of their inability or refusal 
to satisfy worthiness requirements of the Mormon Church. 
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tort, for wrongful termination. Despite this argument, 
plaintiff's Complaint does not address its causes of action in 
tort, as plaintiff now argues, but rather all, except one, 
sound in contract. Count I of plaintiff's Complaint seeks 
recovery for breach of implied covenants of a contract, (R. 5) 
and Count II for breach of contract for alleged non-compliance 
with an employee handbook. (R. 6) Only Count III, plaintiff's 
claim for termination from employment in alleged contravention 
of public policy, is set forth in terms of a tort action. 
As explained more fully below, to permit plaintiff to 
maintain a cause of action on any one of these theories would 
nullify the terminable-at-will doctrine which this court has 
consistently recognized and applied. Consequently, unless this 
court was to drastically alter the traditional rule regarding 
terminable-at-will employment in Utah, it should affirm the 
decision of the lower court. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED 
CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
Plaintiff argues that this court should recognize a 
new cause of action for the breach of implied covenants of good 
faith and fair dealing and thereby permit plaintiff to maintain 
Count I of its Complaint against Sorenson. In support of this 
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argument plaintiff cites in Point II of her brief, several Utah 
cases which plaintiff asserts supports the rule that implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing are read into every 
contract. Not one of these cases, however, is applicable 
here. All of the cases cited by plaintiff involve express 
written contracts, and a recitation of such cases ignores the 
issue, since here there is no express contract of employment 
and the employment relationship is governed by the 
terminable-at-will doctrine. 
For example, in Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982), cited by plaintiff, an implied covenant of good faith 
was applied to a stipulated property settlement in a divorce 
proceeding, and in Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319 (Utah 1975), such a covenant was read into an express real 
estate contract. Plaintiff does not cite one Utah case, 
however, which holds that implied covenants may be read into an 
employment relationship in the absence of an express contract. 
Here, no express contract of employment existed and 
accordingly, no covenant of good faith or fair dealing may be 
implied. To imply such a covenant, in the absence of an 
express employment contract, is in direct contradiction to the 
very premise of the terminable-at-will doctrine, and as such 
has been expressly rejected in states applying this traditional 
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rule. See Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 
1290 (N.D. 111. 1983); Lopez v. Bulova Watch Co. Inc., 582 F. 
Supp. 755 (D.R.I. 1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 
Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Maquire v. American Family 
Life Assurance Co., 442 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), 
rev, denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984) (Florida does not apply 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment 
contracts); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 
58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Gunn v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779 
(1982); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Larsen v. Motor Supply Company, 117 
Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
In Gordon, 562 F. Supp. at 1290, the Federal District 
Court of Illinois held that the implied obligation of fair 
dealing and good faith, an obligation which is generally read 
into all express contracts, is inappropriate in a termination 
case of a terminable-at-will employee because such implied 
conditions cannot create an independent cause of action. An 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will only be 
read into an express contract in aid or furtherance of other 
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terms of an express agreement, and as such it is a derivative 
principle only. It must attach to specific contract terms and 
obligations before it will be read into a contract. Because 
Gordon was an employee at will, the court held that "the duty 
to deal in good faith was appended to nothing which had 
independent life. Therefore no cause of action predicated only 
on the good faith principle may stand and Count I is 
dismissed." Id. 
Such a finding is inescapable in a terminable-at-will 
employment case. To hold otherwise would be completely 
inconsistent with the employer/employee's right to terminate 
the employment at any time with or without cause. In granting 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the New York 
Court of Appeals denied this same argument in Murphy. While 
the New York Court recognized that an obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing may be implied in an express contract, it held 
that: 
No obligation can be implied, however, which 
would be inconsistent with other terms of 
the contractual relationship. Thus, in the 
case now before us, plaintiff's employment 
was at will, a relationship in which law 
accords the employer an unfettered right to 
terminate the employment at any time. In 
the context of such an employment it would 
be incongruous to say that an inference may 
be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed 
-15-
his right of termination. The parties may 
by express agreement limit or restrict the 
employer's right of discharge, but to imply 
such a limitation from the existence of an 
unrestricted right would be internally 
inconsistent. 
448 N.E.2d at 91. (Emphasis added). The same reasoning is 
applicable here. Plaintiff asks this court to "bootstrap" an 
implied obligation, which by law is merely derivative of an 
express contractual provision (which does not exist in this 
case), to overcome Sorenson's right to terminate the 
employment. Such bootstrapping has been rejected by the 
courts, and is completely inconsistent with the 
terminable-at-wi11 relationship. See also, Martin v. Federal 
Life Insurance Company, 109 111. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 
(1982). 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Held, 307 P.2d 210, also 
impliedly rejected the plaintiff's contention that implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing may be read into an 
employment-at-will relationship. The court, after reviewing an 
express contract of employment, rejected the argument that an 
implied covenant of termination for just cause should be read 
into the agreement. The court held that in the absence of an 
express provision it was reasonable to presume that the parties 
did not intend to limit the common law right of employment at 
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will. 307 P.2d at 212. Thus, Utah law will not permit an 
implied covenant to restrict the traditional right of an 
employer or employee to terminate the employment at will. 
The only Utah case cited by plaintiff to support this 
claim, DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), 
is inapplicable here. In DCR, this court held that a party may 
be held liable in tort for failing to exercise due care in its 
performance pursuant to a commercial contract to supply 
services. Ic[. at 436. This case is wholly unrelated to the 
employer/employee situation and is clearly inapplicable here. 
The court did not hold that the business for whom the services 
were performed could be sued in tort for terminating an 
employee relationship. Nor did the court address the 
conditions under which a contract, particularly an employment 
contract, may be terminated. Accordingly, DCR's holding is 
plainly inapplicable here. 
Plaintiff urges this court to join the supposed 
"trend" of courts which have recognized a tort action in 
employment discharge cases, and suggests that Utah law is 
antiquated. In support of this argument plaintiff has cited 
cases from only eight jurisdictions (five of the cases cited 
are from California courts). Additionally, several of the 
cases clearly contradict plaintiff's claim. For example, in 
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Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, cited by 
plaintiff, the Wisconsin Court rejected the theory that a cause 
of action based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
2/ dealing should exist in a terminable-at-will case.— After 
citing the decisions of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) and Fortune v. National Cash Register 
2J Additionally, Fortune v. National Cash Register 
Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), does not support the 
claim that Massachusetts recognizes a cause of action for an 
implied covenant of good faith in the absence of an express 
employment agreement. In Fortune, the court read into an 
express employment contract the obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing. The court recognized this distinction, stating 
"On occasion some courts have avoided the rigidity of the "at 
will" rule by fashioning a remedy in tort. We believe, 
however, that in this case there is a remedy on the express 
contract." 364 N.E.2d at 1256.) Subsequently, the 
Massachusetts court, in Cort v. Bristol Myers, 385 Mass. 300, 
431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) held, in the absence of an express 
employment contract, that the employer may give a false reason 
or pretext for dismissing an employee at will since the 
employer is not obligated to provide any reason at all for the 
termination and no cause of action may exist. 
Additionally, the Pennsylvania case cited by 
plaintiff, Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F.2d 894, 
reh'q denied, 115 BNA LRRM 2426, (3d Cir. 1983), remand 118 BNA 
LRRM 1779 (W.D.Pa. 1985) does not support plaintiff's claim 
that an action may be maintained on the theory of a breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Wolk v. 
Saks Fifth Avenue Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1984) the 
Third Circuit analyzed its decision in Novosel and held: 
[w]hatever the merits of this position, 
there Is as we stated in Novosel, no 
indication that the Pennsylvania courts have 
as yet fashioned or indicated their 
intention to fashion a uniform just cause 
requirement to all discharges. 
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Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), which are also cited 
in plaintiff's Brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded: 
We refuse to impose a duty to terminate in 
good faith into employment contracts. To do 
so would "subject each discharge to judicial 
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad 
faith." Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 
65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982). 
Moreover, we feel it unnecessary and 
unwarranted for the courts to become 
arbiters of any termination that may have a 
tinge of bad faith attached. Imposing a 
good faith duty to terminate would unduly 
restrict an employer's discretion in 
managing the work force. 
355 N.W.2d at 838. 
Moreover, the majority of courts which have had 
occasion to decide this issue have rejected it. In a survey of 
states which has recently been presented with the request to 
imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an 
employment contract, nineteen states have expressly rejected 
3/ 
such an argument.—7 A few of these cases are illustrative. 
In Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), an 
3/ See, C. Bakaly & J. Grossman, Modern Law of 
Employment Contracts, Appendix A (1984 Supplement). The states 
include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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employee brought an action against his former employer for 
wrongful discharge. The Washington court, after reviewing 
court decisions wherein an implied covenant of good faith or 
fair dealing was applied, stated: 
We do not adopt this exception. An 
employer's interest in running his business 
as he sees fit must be balanced against the 
interest of the employee in maintaining his 
employment and this exception does not 
strike the proper balance. We believe that 
"to imply into each employment contract a 
duty to terminate in good faith would . . . 
subject each discharge to judicial 
incursions into the amorphous concept of bad 
faith." Moreover, while an employer may 
agree to restrict or limit his right to 
discharge an employee, to imply such a 
restriction on that right from the existence 
of a contractual right, which, by its terms 
has no restrictions, is internally 
inconsistent. 
685 P.2d at 1086, quoting Parnar, 65 Haw. at 377, 652 P.2d at 
629; Accord, Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 3335 N.W.2d 834; 
Daniel, 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699; Accord, Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d 
293, 448 N.E. 2086, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (emphasis added) 
[citations omitted]. The court also noted that such an 
intrusion into the employment relationship was a matter more 
appropriate for the legislature. Ld. at 1086-1087. In Daniel, 
620 P.2d at 703, the court refused to follow Monge1s holding of 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in an 
employment contract. The court noted that: 
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We refuse to follow Monge. The effect of 
adhering to such a rule would be to expose 
an employer to a lawsuit every time he 
discharges an employee with a contract 
terminable at will. Under the Monge rule, 
such a contract is transformed into a hybrid 
contract under which the employee cannot be 
discharged unless his work is unsatisfactory 
or his services are no longer needed. The 
Monge court resolved the issue by rewriting 
the employment contract so that an employee 
cannot be fired except for cause. In that 
way, the Monge decision is a substitute for 
a union collective bargaining agreement. 
In Martin, 440 N.E.2d at 1006, the court held "[c]are 
must be taken to prevent the transmutation of every breach of 
contract into an independent tort action through the 
bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith 
and fair dealing. We conclude that existing principles of tort 
law are adequate without our creating a new action based on a 
vague notion of fair dealing.11 
Even the minority courts which recognize a claim for 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith in employment 
contracts emphasize that the exception should not be used as a 
basis for judicial policy-making in contravention of an 
employer's fundamental right to operate its business. In 
Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257, relied on by plaintiff to support 
her claim for wrongful termination, the court held that 
discharging an agent/employee to preclude payment of 
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substantial commissions which the agent had earned, constituted 
an actionable claim for bad faith termination. In so holding, 
however, the Massachusetts court stressed that its decision was 
based solely upon the employer's bad faith denial of 
commissions which the terminated employee had earned. The 
court did not endorse review of an employer's right to 
terminate. It rioted: 
We do not question the general principles 
that an employer is entitled to be motivated 
by and to serve its own legitimate business 
interests; that an employer must have wide 
latitude in deciding whom it will employ m 
the face of the uncertainties of the 
business world; and that an employer needs 
flexibility in the face of changing 
circumstances. 
Id. at 1256. (Emphasis added). See also Shapiro v. Wells 
Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 
613, 619 (1984) (noting that the law of bad-faith breach of 
contract is well developed only in the insurance field; 
complaint for breach of implied covenant dismissed). 
The judicial insertion of a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing into a terminable-at-will employment 
relationship would be inconsistent with an employer/employee's 
unrestrained right to terminate employment and would 
completely nullify the effect of that doctrine. The 
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modification of the terminable-at-will rule would result in a 
judicial rewriting of each contract between an employer and 
employee and subject each discharge to judicial review. This 
court should join the majority of courts which have correctly 
reviewed this issue and reject plaintiff's argument. 
III. 
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT UPON BREACH OF 
AN EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 
In Count II of plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff 
alleges that Sorenson's employee handbook imposes upon Sorenson 
a duty to deal with plaintiff fairly and in good faith and to 
refrain from termination except for "good cause." (R. 6) 
Nowhere, however, is there reference in plaintiff's brief to a 
provision in Sorenson's employee handbook limiting its right to 
terminate to "good cause". There is no such provision. 
Plaintiff alleges, however, that a "good cause" provision for 
termination be read into the employment relationship and that, 
a cause of action in tort may exist for its breach. Despite 
plaintiff's characterization of this action as an action in 
tort (Plaintiff's Brief at 20), it is an action based on 
contract. The minority decisions cited by plaintiff which have 
held that an employer's policy manual or handbook may 
contractually modify the employer's right to terminate-at-will, 
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have characterized the cause of action as one of contract, and 
have required that the elements of contract, i.e., formation, 
offer, acceptance and consideration be present. See, Thompson, 
102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081; Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pugh v. See1s 
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 
(1981). Those contractual elements do not exist in this case. 
Furthermore, the cases cited by plaintiff are easily 
distinguishable from this case. In Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 
893, the employee manual in question expressly stated that Blue 
Cross would "release employees for just cause only." 
Additionally the employee received oral assurances of job 
security before accepting employment. Id. at 890. In See's 
Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917, the same type of oral 
assurances and the same limiting clause of dismissal only for 
cause existed. This case is clearly distinguishable on these 
points. Sorenson's employee handbook does not restrict 
Sorenson's right to terminate for "good cause." Thus, even 
applying the decisions of Toussaint and See's Candies, absent 
any language in the employee's handbook limiting Sorenson's 
right to terminate an employee for just cause, or oral 
assurances of job security, no cause of action exists even in 
those states which have recognized a cause of action for breach 
of an employee handbook. 
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The majority of courts which have considered 
plaintiff's argument have rejected it. The rule of law 
followed by these courts provides that an employee manual or an 
employer's policy statement is merely a unilateral statement of 
position of the employer, which provides mere guidelines which 
may or may not be followed at the employer's discretion. In 
Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 
1063 (1982), later appealed, 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983) the 
plaintiff's employer alleged that her termination was contrary 
to the terms of an employee handbook, which specified that 
prior to termination for unsatisfactory performance a warning 
would be given to the employee. Ic[. at 1066. In rejecting 
this argument, the court held that the handbook was merely "a 
unilateral statement of company policies and procedures. Its 
terms were not bargained for, and there was no meeting of the 
minds. The policies may be changed unilaterally at any time." 
In Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 
551 P.2d 779 (1976) the plaintiff sought to establish an 
employment contract by arguing that the employer's "Company 
Policy Manual" constituted an express contract of employment 
which limited the employer's right to terminate to "just 
cause." In discussing the employee manual, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held: 
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It appears to be a general statement of 
company policies dealing with employee's 
benefits, insurance, vacations, holidays, 
etc., as well as general operating 
procedures and plant rules. . . . We find 
nothing in the manual expressly providing 
tor a fixed term of employment, nor is there 
language from which a contract to that 
effect could be inferred. 
It was only a unilateral expression of 
company policy and procedures. Its terms 
were not bargained for by the parties and 
any benefits conferred by it were mere 
gratuities. Certainly, no meeting of the 
minds was evidenced by the defendant's 
unilateral act of publishing company policy. 
551 P.2d at 782. Additionally, in Reynolds Manufacturing Co. 
v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) the court 
dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the employer was liable 
for wrongful termination for not following the termination 
policy set forth in its employee manual which required a 
warning and probation prior to termination. The court found 
that the employer was in no way prevented from unilaterally 
amending or even withdrawing the handbook and that such 
handbooks constituted no more than general guidelines which 
would not restrict the manner or method of termination. Id. at 
539. See also, Enis v. Continental Illinois National Bank & 
Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. 111. 1984)? Muller v. 
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983); White v. Chelsea Industries, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 
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1983); Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (employee booklet does not alter at will 
employment since it is unilateral expression of guidelines); 
Cf. Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or.96 643 P.2d 1276, 
1278-79 (1982) (just cause for termination statement in 
employee handbook satisfied if employer reasonably and in good 
faith believes sufficient cause for termination exists; jury 
not entitled to decide whether facts amounting to just cause 
exist); Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982) (personnel policies are not part of the employment 
contract when such policies were unilaterally implemented by 
the employer and could be changed by it.); Campbell v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 421 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1981); Mau v. Omaha National 
Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Sargent v. Illinois 
Institute of Technology, 78 111. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 
(1979) (a personnel manual not an enforceable contract because 
it was not bargained for nor was any consideration given); Shaw 
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975) 
(handbook not binding because employment relationship 
terminable at will and employee did not limit his right to quit 
work). 
The only Utah case relied upon by plaintiff in support 
of this claim is Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 
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P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981). In Piacitelli, a counselor at Southern 
Utah State College brought suit, alleging that the College's 
decision not to renew his yearly employment contract was not in 
compliance with the procedures for dismissing employees 
contained in the College's personnel manual. Ici. at 1064. At 
the trial level the district court held that the plaintiff 
could be terminated only pursuant to the procedures contained 
in the College's personnel manual. Id., at 1065. That final 
decision by the lower court was not appealed. Subsequently the 
counselor brought a separate action seeking reinstatement and 
back pay. Id,. On appeal, this court affirmed the lower 
court's order denying reinstatement and awarding back pay, but 
emphasized that it was not affirming the district court's 
earlier ruling that the College's personnel manual was part of 
the plaintiff's contract of employment. Referring to that 
earlier ruling by the district court, the court declared: 
This was a final order, which unless 
reversed on appeal is res judicata and 
binding upon these parties. The order was 
not appealed. Consequently, for purposes of 
this case, we must treat Piacitelli as an 
employee with permanent employment status 
whose employment contract entitled him to 
the formal procedures specified in the 
Personnel Manual before he could be 
dismissed or terminated, even at the 
conclusion of the annual contract period. 
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Id. at 1065.— The Piacitelli decision cannot be cited as 
precedent in this case. This court did not decide whether an 
at-will employee working under a contract of indefinite 
duration may sue for breach of an implied contract under Utah 
law. Because the court was bound, under principles of res 
judicata, to treat the plaintiff as a permanent employee who 
was entitled under this contract to certain review procedures 
prior to termination, the court had no opportunity to address 
the terminable-at-will rule. Consequently, the rule 
articulated by the court in Bihlmaier continues to be the law 
in Utah regarding at-will employment contracts. Cf. Williams 
v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017, 1020 (10th Cir. 1983); 
Heward v. Western Electric Co., F.2d , 116 BNA 
£/ In a footnote to the foregoing text in 
Piacitelli, the court further emphasized that it was not 
deciding whether the lower court's ruling on the personnel 
manual was correct. It stated: 
We intimate no agreement or disagreement 
with the court's construction of 
Piacitelli's employment status or with its 
conclusion on the rights of classified 
College employees receiving annual notices 
of appointment. The fact that the question 
is res judicata settles those questions for 
these litigants in this case only. 
Id. n.2 (emphasis added). 
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L.R.R.M. 3423 (10th Cir. 1984), (declaring that Bihlmaier 
continues to be the law in Utah on termination of persons 
employed under contracts of indefinite duration). 
As noted above, this case does not rise to the same 
level as the decision in Toussaint, and See's Candies, 
Sorenson's employee handbook does not establish a contract of 
employment for a specific duration of time, nor does it require 
that a termination be made only for "just cause". Nothing in 
the handbook limits the terminable-at-will relationship that 
exists in this case, and this court should affirm the lower 
court's decision dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. 
IV. 
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT 
RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF TERMINATION IN THIS 
CASE. 
Plaintiff also seeks to avoid the effects of the 
terminable-at-will doctrine by asking this court to create a 
"public policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
In Count III of plaintiff's Complaint, it asserts that public 
policy of the State of Utah, as codified in Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 34-20-1 to 34-20-13 (1953), as amended, imposes upon 
employers an implied contractual duty to "act fairly and in 
good faith" and "to refrain from terminating its employees for 
reasons which are contrary to such public policy." Despite 
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such a contention, this court has never recognized a "public 
policy" exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will, nor 
would such an exception be applicable in this case. 
In Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. 
Supp. at 829, the plaintiffs contended that they should be 
entitled to maintain a cause of action for wrongful termination 
because the firing of plaintiffs for religious reasons violated 
a compelling national policy against religious discrimination. 
The court acknowledged the minority of decisions which have 
created the public policy exception but held that Utah law did 
not recognize such an exception. The court noted: 
The long history of the Utah Supreme Court's 
recognition of the terminable-at-will 
doctrine, the language the Court has used in 
dismissing those cases and the failure of 
the Court to ever suggest that it might 
recognize an exception to that rule lead 
this Court to the conclusion that the 
recognition of an exception to the 
terminable-at-will doctrine would be a 
change in Utah law." 
Id. Utah has recognized no exception to the terminable-at-will 
doctrine, and this court should affirm the lower court's 
decision in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
Although Utah has not acknolwedged a "public policy" 
exception, the facts in this case do not demonstrate that 
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public policy was violated. The minority decisions which have 
granted a cause of action for wrongrul termination in 
contravention of a clearly articulated public policy have, for 
the most part, been very limited in their scope. These courts 
have ruled the terminable-at-will doctrine inapplicable when an 
employee is discharged for refusing to violate a criminal 
statute, or when exercising a statutory right or complying with 
a statutory duty. For example, in Petermann v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 
(1959), the leading case on the public policy exception, the 
plaintiff was discharged for failure to commit perjury before a 
legislative committee. The California court recognized that 
the public policy of the state, as reflected in the penal code 
would be seriously impaired. 344 P.2d at 27. A public policy 
exception was also recognized by the Oregon Court when a 
discharge was premised on the employee's participation in jury 
duty, in contravention of public policy expressed in the state 
constitution, Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), 
and in Indiana where the public policy was violated by 
termination of an employee for the filing of a workmen's 
compensation claim. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 
Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). However, "in view of the 
somewhat vague meaning of the term public policy, few courts 
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have been inclined to apply the public policy exception absent 
a violation of statutes or clearly defined policy." Parnar, 
652 P.2d at 630-31 (emphasis added). The court in Parnar 
acknowledged: 
In determining whether a clear mandate 
of public policy is violated, courts should 
inquire whether the employer's conduct 
contravenes the letter or purpose of a 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory 
provision or scheme. . . . However, courts 
should proceed cautiously if called upon to 
declare public policy absent some prior 
legislative or judicial expression on the 
subject. 
Id. at 631. (Emphasis added). 
Similar reasoning was applied in Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), a case 
cited extensively by plaintiff. In Pierce, the court found no 
violation of public policy when a physician/employee was 
terminated for refusal to work on a drug research project, and 
the court held that "an employer may discharge an employee who 
refuses to work unless the refusal is based on a clear mandate 
of public policy." 417 A.2d at 514. In Brockmeyer, 834 N.W.2d 
at 840,—' the court, while recognizing a narrow public policy 
i!/ The cases cited in plaintiff's brief to support 
a public policy exception unanimously recognize that the public 
policy exception is very limited in scope. In addition to 
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exception, held that such an exception is limited to a 
discharge contrary to a "fundamental and well defined public 
policy as evidenced by existing law" and that "[c]ourts should 
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations. 
No employer should be subject to suit merely because a 
discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the 
public may have denied some benefit from it." 
In this case no clear legislative mandate has been 
violated, nor does a clear mandate of public policy exist. 
Plaintiff relies solely upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-20-1 to 
34-20-13, as the mandate of legislative authority which 
allegedly restricts the terminable-at-will doctrine. This 
section of the Code is entitled "Employment Relations and 
Collective Bargaining" and deals entirely with the relationship 
of the employer and employee in the collective bargaining 
context. It provides for the establishment of a labor 
V(con't) those noted above, all agree on this 
principle. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) 
(accepts a narrow public policy exception: the employee must 
prove that a stated public policy, either legislatively or 
judicially recognized, has been violated); Palmateer v. 
International Harvester Co., 85 111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 
(1981) (dismissal for informing law enforcement officers of 
violation of criminal statute); Harless v. First National Bank, 
162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (discharge for reporting 
violations of state and federal consumer credit and protection 
laws.) 
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relations board and defines the rights and duties of employers 
and employees in the collective bargaining context. In 
subsection 8 of this section of the Code, it generally 
prohibits employers from interfering with the employee's right 
to organize and bargain collectively/ and paragraph 17(f) 
specifically prohibits an employer "to discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges 
or given testimony under this act." 
The policy expressed in Utah's Employment Relations 
and Collective Bargaining Act is expressly limited to the 
collective bargaining area. In subsection 4 of that Act it 
states that the policy of the state is "to establish standards 
of fair conduct in employment relations and to provide a 
convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which those 
interests may have their respective rights and obligations 
adjudicated." This policy is effectuated by the creation of 
the Labor Relations Board and unfair labor practices designated 
by the Legislature are heard before that Board. Nowhere in 
this section does it discuss employer-employee relationships 
outside of the area of collective bargaining and nowhere does 
it require the implied obligations of good faith and fair 
dealing to be superimposed into employment relationships. This 
statute is clearly inapplicable to this case and does not 
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represent the required "clear mandate" of the legislature to 
limit or restrict the terminable-at-will relationship between 
an employer and employee* Sorenson is a non-union employer and 
plaintiff does not allege in its Complaint that plaintiff was 
terminated for participation in any union activities. Thus, 
even in those minority states which have acknowledged a narrow 
public policy exception, this case does not present a violation 
of public policy. 
V. 
ONLY THE LEGISLATURE MAY MODIFY THE 
TERMINABLE-AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
The interpretation of public policy and the 
establishment of laws to promote or protect public policy are 
matters best accomplished by the Legislature. In particular, 
the Legislature is the appropriate forum to consider and 
accommodate the competing interests that would be affected by a 
change in the terminable-at-will employment doctrine. See 
Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). 
In Murphy, the New York Court, in affirming a 
dismissal of plaintiff's claims for wrongful discharge, 
emphasized that it could recognize the plaintiff's cause of 
action only by altering the traditional at-will doctrine and 
declined to do so without an express mandate from the 
Legislature. The court noted that: 
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Those jurisdictions that have modified the 
traditional at-will rule appear to have been 
motivated by conclusions that the freedom of 
contract underpinnings of the rule have 
become outdated, that individual employees 
in the modern work force do not have the 
bargaining power to negotiate security for 
the jobs on which they have grown to rely, 
and that the rule yields harsh results for 
those employees who do not enjoy the 
benefits of express contractual limitations 
on the power of dismissal. Whether these 
conclusions are supportable or whether for 
other compelling reasons employers should, 
as a matter of policy, be held liable to 
at-will employees discharged in 
circumstances for which no liability has 
existed at common law, are issues better 
left to resolution at the hands of the 
Legislature. In addition to the fundamental 
question whether such liability should be 
recognized . . ., of no less practical 
importance is the definition of its 
configuration if it is to be recognized.... 
The Legislature has infinitely greater 
resources and procedural means to discern 
the public will, to examine the variety of 
pertinent considerations, to elicit the 
views of the various segments of the 
community that would be directly affected 
and in any event critically interested, and 
to investigate and anticipate the impact of 
imposition of such liability. 
Id. 461 N.Y.S.2d at 234-235. 
Numerous other courts have also refused to recognize 
exceptions for the terminable-at-will doctrine without the 
deliberation and pronouncement by their respective 
legislatures. See, Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, 585 F. 
Supp. 1260 (D. Kan. 1984) (the Kansas court would adhere to the 
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view expressed in Murphy); Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri 
Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982) (an implied obligation of 
good faith must be created by the law-making authority); Kelly 
v, Mississippi Valley Gas Co,, 397 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (in 
the absence of legislatively provided sanctions an employee 
will have no cause of action); Watson v. Zep Manufacturing Co./ 
582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (if such an obligation is 
read into every employment agreement, the legislature must make 
that determination). 
These considerations should be given controlling 
weight here. The Utah Legislature has already expressly 
prohibited the denial of employment opportunities for some 
reasons and none of these reasons are applicable in this 
6/ 
case.— 
In this connection, the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
recently declared, after noting that few courts have been 
±/ See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8 (1953) 
(Anti-Discrimination Act, forbidding employment decisions made 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, age, 
national origin, or handicap). Utah Code Ann. ^ 34-37-16 
(forbidding employers to deny or terminate employment because 
of refusal to submit to polygraph examination); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-20-8(f) (prohibiting termination for fiLing charges or 
giving testimony in unfair labor practice proceeding). Current 
Utah law thus indicates that the Legislature has already seen 
fit to limit an employer's right to terminate employees for 
discriminatory reasons or for other reasons deemed violative of 
public policy. 
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inclined to apply the public policy exception absent a clearly 
defined public policy, that "[t]hese decisions manifest a 
reluctance of courts to unjustifiably intrude on the employment 
arrangement or to arrogate to themselves the perceived 
legislative function of declaring public policy." Parnar; 652 
P.2d at 631. Thus, in light of the Legislature's ability and 
inclination to limit the employment-at-will doctrine in very 
specific instances, this court should decline to adopt the 
extremely broad exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine 
which plaintiff urges. 
VI. 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE CONTINUED 
VITALITY OF UTAh'S TERMINABLE-AT-WILL 
DOCTRINE 
As early as 1877, the United States courts developed 
the employment-at-will doctrine. H.G. Wood, in his treatise on 
master-servant relationships, articulated the following rule: 
With us the rule is inflexible that a 
general or indefinite hiring is prima facia 
a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks 
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden 
is upon him to establish it by proof. A 
hiring at so much a day, week, month, or 
year, no time being specified, is an 
indefinite hiring, and no presumption 
attaches that it was for a day even, but 
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the 
party may serve. 
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H. Wood, Master and Servant § 134 (2d ed. 1886). The judiciary 
found that Wood's Rule equitably facilitated economic and 
industrial development, provided the employer flexibility to 
control his work place and allowed the employee the freedom to 
resign if he found more favorable employment or if working 
conditions became intolerable. 
Although limited exceptionb to the terminable-at-will 
doctrine have developed in a minority of states, the 
terminable-at-will doctrine is widely recognized. In addition 
to specific statutory exceptions, some state courts have 
developed a public policy exception which limits causes of 
action to four types of employment discharges: (1) discharges 
for refusing to violate a criminal statute; (2) discharges tor 
exercising a statutory right; (3) discharges for fulfilling a 
statutory duty; and (4) discharges in violation of a general 
public policy. See Comment, Limiting the Right to Terminate at 
Will — Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 Vander. L. 
Rev. 201, 203-04 (1982). While these exceptions to the at-will 
doctrine preserve certain public vital interests, the 
terminable-at-will doctrine itself serves many important public 
policy interests. 
Though some critics of the employment-at-will doctrine 
have suggested the need for change, a thorough analysis of the 
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terminable-at-will doctrine demonstrates the legitimate 
countervailing interests of the employer. Those interests 
should not be ignored. The court in Monge v. Bebbe Rubber Co., 
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 recognized the importance of 
balancing the competing public interests. 
In all employment contracts, whether at will 
or for definite term, the employer's 
interest in running his business as he sees 
fit must be balanced against the interest of 
the employee in maintaining his employment, 
and the public's interest in maintaining a""" 
proper balance between the two. 
316 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added). In carefully balancing the 
interests of the employer, the employee and society, this court 
should consider the following public interests which are servea 
by the terminable-at-will doctrine. The terminable-at-will 
doctrine, as recognized in Utah and the majority of states, 
provides 1) greater certainty in the work place; 2) decreases 
the incidence of improper and vexatious lawsuits; and 
3) facilitates economic development. See generally Comment, 
supra at 223-31. 
First, even the limited judicial expansion of the 
public policy exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine has 
created an atmosphere of uncertainty in the work place; neither 
the employer nor the employee can be certain whether a 
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particular discharge is a violation of a "general public 
policy." This uncertainty has arisen because of the absence of 
clearly defined public policy standards by which the parameters 
of a proper cause of action may be established. Because of 
this vagueness, an employer may honestly believe he is 
justified in discharging an employee, while the distraught 
employee interprets the dismissal to be in bad faith or in 
retaliation. The employer might thus be forced to liti9ate the 
merits of a discharge that he had no way of knowing in advance 
might be considered unfair. 
Addressing the effects of a broad public policy 
exception, the court in Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 
320, 620 P.2d 699 recognized that "[t]he effect of adhering to 
such a rule would be to expose an employer to a lawsuit every 
time he discharged an employee with a contract 
terminable-at-will." Idk at 703. It has been noted that: 
Judicially created exceptions to the 
terminable at will doctrine without clear 
bases [sic] in legislatively articulated 
public policy create uncertainty because an 
employer cannot be assured that a court will 
not, in hindsight, decide that an employee's 
conduct was in the best interests of the 
state and, therefore, favored by public 
policy. . . . Under existing guidelines, 
the boundaries of these actions are defined 
only by the imagination of the plaintiff's 
attorneys. 
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See Comment, supra at 228 (emphasis added). In addition, it 
has been argued that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in expanding 
its public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, 
has eroded employer discretion to direct the 
work place and has placed courts in the 
position of supervising employer-employee 
relations. By creating an exception to the 
at-will doctrine based on public policy, the 
court has established a vague, unworkable 
concept as its touch stone. 
Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.; Is the Public 
Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the 
Employment Relationship?, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 1187, 1194 (1981). 
Accordingly, Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine 
provides both employees and employers with notice of what 
constitutes grounds for discharging an employee working 
pursuant to a terminable-at-will contract. The clarity and 
decisiveness of Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine and of a 
narrow "public policy" exception as expressed by the 
Legislature, promotes the public's interest in certainty within 
the work place. 
Second, judicial expansion of the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine may also subject 
employers to vexatious lawsuits. Under the Monge rationale, an 
employee may claim that his discharge was motivated by bad 
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faith, malice, or retaliation and, therefore, is not in the 
interest of the public good. The decision in Fortune sets 
forth that an employee may simply allege bad faith on the part 
of the employer. Further, jurisdictions following the 
Palmateer and Harless decisions afford no clear standards to 
guide an employer in evaluating whether an employee's conduct 
justifies dismissal. Given these unclear judicial standards 
the employer is an easy target of terminated employees and is 
continually exposed to the threat of suit for wrongful 
discharge. Expansive public policy exceptions to the 
terminable-at-will doctrine encourage vexatious claims from 
discharged employees. Moreover, often employers must settle 
wrongful discharge claims out of court, given the tendency of 
juries to side with the employee and the employer's difficulty 
in obtaining summary judgment. See generally Comment, supra 
notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
Third, courts defining the public policy exception 
must also consider the economic impact of their decisions. The 
courts have long recognized the "legitimate interest of 
employers in hiring and retaining the best personnel 
available." Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 
319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974). Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine 
facilitates uninhibited employment evaluations by employers, 
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thereby promoting more efficient performance and production. 
The effect of broadening the scope of the public policy-
exception "will be to allow the courts to become arbiters of 
employment relations and to diminish employer discretion to 
direct the work place." Ici. at 179. Further, the Geary court 
noted that the continuing threat of suit will "hinder employers 
in making critical judgments concerning employee 
qualifications." d^.. See Note, supra at 119!J. Finally, an 
expansive public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, as 
upheld in Pierce, "infringes on the private employer's freedom 
to direct his own business without interference from the courts 
or any other adjudicatory mechanism." Note, supra at 1197-98. 
The exception is particularly intrusive with respect to the 
managerial employees whose loyalty is essential to an orderly 
work place. Professor Blades recognized this important public 
interest as follows: 
The employer's evaluation of the higher 
ranking employee is usually a highly 
personalized, intuitive judgment, and, as 
such, is more difficult to translate into 
concrete reasons which someone else--a 
juryman—can readily understand and 
appreciate. . . . Compromise of the 
employer's power to make such judgments 
about professional, managerial or other 
high-ranking employees . . . is especially 
undesirable. 
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See generally Comment, supra at 229-30., quoting Blades, 
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom; On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 
1428-29 (1967). 
Expanding exceptions to the termmable-at-will 
doctrine certainly increases an employer's hesitancy to fire an 
employee. Such hesitancy will lead not only to a drop in 
production efficiency, but also to a corresponding increase in 
cost. Several courts have expressed their unwillingness to 
infringe upon the employer's business judgment in this area. 
See Comment, supra at 230. Of major concern to the economic 
well-being of our nation, is a business1 ability to respond 
flexibly to changing economic conditions. 
Fluctuations in the business cycle, shifts 
in demand, or technological changes 
sometimes require firms to lay off workers 
temporarily or to cut back the size of 
departments permanently. Managers should be 
free to make these decisions without the 
threat of litigation by workers claiming 
that they were wrongfully discharged. A 
workable definition of wrongful discharge 
can be formulated to shelter these decisions 
for the possibility of debilitating 
litigation. 
Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful 
Discharge; The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1816, 1835 (1980). 
-46-
Increased liability for wrongful discharge 
will generally raise the costs of hiring and 
firing. By altering only one term — 
termination rights — among a range of 
possible terms, which include wage rates, 
working conditions, and fringe benefits, the 
court leaves the employer free to shift the 
costs of the new protection in most cases 
employees will eventually wind up "paying" 
at least part of the new term's cost. Thus, 
. . . abolition of the at-will rule will not 
significantly change the overall balance if 
advantage between employers and employees. 
Id. at 1829. 
The continued vitality of Utah's terminable-at-will 
doctrine also finds support in the following economic 
considerations. Utah's terminable-at-will doctrine presently 
provides significant disincentives to an employer who 
discharges any employee. Arbitrary discharges often result in 
a waste or loss of recruiting time, training expense, job 
expertise and continuity. To the extent the employer bears 
these costs, he will limit the number of wrongful or 
economically inefficient discharges in order to minimize his 
losses. Xci. at 1834. Further, an employer's legitimate 
concern with the possibility of fraudulent, frivolous, or 
nuisance suits being brought by disgruntled employees who were 
discharged for perfectly valid reasons provides an additional 
safeguard against unwarranted discharges. See Blades, supra, 
n. 5, at 1427-30. 
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In the instant action no legislatively articulated 
public policy has been violated. On the contrary, the 
defendant, in good faith and for a justifiable purpose, has 
exercised sound management discretion in discharging the 
plaintiff for failing to report to work. The defendant made 
reasonable attempts to preserve the plaintiff's employment 
relationship; nevertheless, when the plaintiff's failure to 
report to work reached the point of becoming economically 
inefficient, the defendant had no choice but to exercise its 
right to termination. As noted by Baxter & Wohl, Wrongful 
Termination Lawsuits; The Employers Finally Win a Few, 10 
Employ. Rel. L.J. 258, 269 (1984), "[e]mployers are not 
omniscient. Like all mortals, they can act only on the 
evidence known to them." To restrict the application of Utah's 
long-standing terminable-at-will doctrine would be to paralyze 
managerial decision making. Such a restriction would clearly 
contravene the public's interests in fostering certainty in the 
marketplace, in reducing the incidence of improper and 
vexatious lawsuits in the already crowded courts, and in having 
strong economic growth and development. 
CONCLUSION 
Under well established Utah law, plaintiff does not 
have a cause of action for alleged wrongful termination of 
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employment in Utah because the employment was of an indefinite 
duration and therefore terminable at the will of either party . 
This court has previously rejected the argument that Utah 
should recognize a new cause of action for wrongful termination 
under an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
Although Utah has not had to decide whether public policy or an 
employee handbook should limit or extinguish the 
terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah, this court should follow 
the well reasoned opinions of the majority of courts that have 
decided such issues, and reject them. To accept plaintiff's 
arguments would fundamentally change the employment law and 
practices in the State of Utah, a function which is within the 
propriety of the Legislature. The policy reasons for the 
application of trie terminable-at-will doctrine in Utah are 
sound, and this court should not expand the exceptions to this 
rule without a clear mandate from the Legislature. 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fjiU day of June, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
W. R6bert W r ^ h t ~ 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys foi Defendant-Respondent 
Sorenson Research Company 
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34-20-13. Ri~ht to strike. 
34-20-1. Declaration of policy.—The public policy of the state 8s to 
employment relations and collective hnrpaininp in the furtherance of which 
this chapter is cnaotcd0 is declared to bo sis follows : 
(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: 
that of the public, the employee, and the employer These throe interests 
are to a considerable extent interrelated It is the policy of the state to 
protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation 
and to the rights of the others. 
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate income for the employee, 
and uninterrupted production of poods and services are promotive of 
all of these interests. They are largely dependent upon the maintenance of 
fair, friendly, and mutually satisfactory employment relations and the 
availability of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of what-
ever controversies may arise. It is reropnized that certain employers, in-
cluding farmers and farmer co-operatives, in addition to their pen era 1 
employer problems, face special problems arisinp from perishable com-
modities and seasonal production which require adequate considers-
15 
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tion. It is also recognized that whatever may be the rights of disputants 
with respect to each other in any controversy regarding employment re-
lations, they should not be permitted in the conduct of their controversy to 
intrude directly into the primary rights of third parties to earn a livelihood, 
transact business, and engage in the ordinary affairs of life by any lawful 
means and free from molestation, interference, restraint, or coercion. 
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions of work should result from 
voluntary agreement between employer and employee. For the purpose 
of such negotiation an employee has the right, if he desires, to associate 
with others in organizing and bargaining collectively through representa-
tives of his own choosing, without intimidation or coercion from any 
source. 
(4) It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and promote the 
interests of the public, the employee, and the employer alike, to establish 
standards of fair conduct in employment relations and to provide a con-
venient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which these interests may 
have their respective rights and obligations adjudicated. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-1, enacted by L. ."1 C..J.S. Labor isolations ;^ U:». 
1069, ch. 85, § 14. -IS Am. Ju r . lM 7o2, L.'ibor and Labor 
Relations § 119S. 
Cross-Reference. 
Injunct ions in labor disputes, 31-19 2 ci Subjects of mandatory collective bar-
seq. £.iining under Federal Labor I l l a t i o n s 
„ „
 4 ,r> r
 A c t
»
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« 
CoUatcrai References. 
Labor Hela t ionsC^ITI . 
34-20-2. Definitions.—As used in this chapter: 
(1) The word "person" includes one or more individuals, partner-
ships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees 
in bankruptcy or receivers. 
(2) The word "employer" includes any person acting in tlie interest 
of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the Tinted 
States, or any state or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject 
to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 ot seq.], or any labor organiza-
tion (other than when acting as an employer), or any corporation or 
association operating a hospital if no part of the net earnings inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or anyone acting 
in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization. 
(3) The word "employee" includes any employee, but shall not be lim-
ited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this chapter explicitly 
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased 
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or 
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other 
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include 
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic 
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employer by 
his parent or spouse. 
(4) The word "representatives" includes any individual or labor 
organization. 
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(5) The words "labor organization'' mean any organization of any 
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in 
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or 
in part of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
(6) The word "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transporta-
tion, or communication within the state of Utah. 
(7) The words ^affecting commerce" mean in commerce, or burdening 
or obstructing commerce or the free How of commerce, or having led or 
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or 
the free flow of commerce within the state of Utah. 
(8) The words "unfair labor practice" mean any unfair labor practice 
listed in section 34-20-8. 
(9) The words "labor dispute" mean any controversy between an 
employer and the majority of his employees in a collective bargaining 
unit concerning the right or process or details of collective bargaining or 
the designation of representatives. 
(10) The words "secondary boycott" include combining or conspiring 
to cause or threaten to cause injury to one with whom no labor dispute 
exists, whether by: (a) withholding patronage, labor, or other beneficial 
business intercourse; (b) picketing; (c) refusing to handle, install, use, or 
work on particular materials, equipment, or supplies; or (d) by any other 
unlawful means, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan 
to coerce or inflict damage upon another. 
(11) The word "election" means a proceeding in which the em-
ployees in a collective bargaining unit cast a secret ballot for collective 
bargaining representatives or for any other purpose specified in this chapter 
and >shall include elections conducted by the board or by any tribunal 
having competent jurisdiction or whose jurisdiction was accepted by the 
parties. 
(12) The words "labor relations board" mean the industrial com-
mission of Utah. 
Hibtory: C. l(Jf>3, 34-20-2, enacted by L. 
1^69, ch. 85, § 15. 
34-20-3. Labor relations board.—(1) The industrial commission of 
Utah is designated as the labor relations board for the state of Utah. 
(2) A vacancy in the board shall not impair the right of the remaining 
members to exercise all the powers of the board, and two members of the 
board shall at all times constitute a quorum. The board shall have an official 
seal which shall be judicially noticed. 
(3) The board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in 
writing to the legislature and to the governor stating in detail the cases it 
has heard, the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries and duties of 
all employees and officers in the employ or under the supervision of the 
board, and an account cf ail moneys it lias disbursed. 
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History: C. 1953, 34-20-3, enacted by 
L. 196L\ ch. 85, § 16. 
Cross-References. 
Board of labor to be provided, Const. 
Art . XVI, § 2. 
Indu&trial cotumib&iou, Title 35. 
Function of board. 
The function of the labor relations 
board is not to provide leadership for a 
union. Vnles«« there is evidence of com-
pany interference, the action of the union 
membership in choosing their officers and 
in direct ing their act ivi t ies i* no concern 
to the hoard. I ' tah Poultry Producers' Co-
op. A*>n. v Utah Labor Kelutioiis hoard , 
U'O l \ Ut>4, 149 P. 2d 043. 
Nature and jurisdiction of board. 
The I ' tah Labor de la t ions Board is a 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-5, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 18. 
creature of s ta tu te and any actiou brought 
by it is a special one under a s ta tu tory 
provision; therefore, there is no presump-
tion of jurisdict ion. Furbroedrra Agricul-




."WA C.J.S. Labor Relations § ."01. 
48 Am. Ju r . 2d 727, Labor and Labor 
K< lations § 1 l.V> et seq. 
Lnfoiveiueut of labor board's order 
a^.iil^t « luplov er's Mo ci hsora, a.^i^us, or 
tlie llbe, 4»i A.'L. P. 2d ."ii»2. 
S ta te ' s power to enjoin violation of col-
lective labor contract as affected by feder-
al labor relations acts, :'.2 A. L. II. 2d S2D. 
34-20-4. Labor relations board — Employees — Agencies — Expenses. 
—(1) The board may employ an executive secretary, attorneys, examin-
ers, and may employ such other employees with regard to existing laws ap-
plicable to the employment and compensation of oflBcers and employees of 
the state as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper perform-
ance of its duties. The board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or 
other agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as 
may from time to time be needed. Attorneys employed under this section 
may, at the direction of the board, appear for and represent the board in 
any case in court. Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the 
board to employ individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation (or 
for statistical work) where and if such service may be obtained from the 
department of labor. 
(2) All of the expenses of the board, including the necessary traveling 
expenses, incurred by the members or employees of the board under its 
orders, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers 
therefor approved by the board or by any individual it designates for 
the purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-4, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 17. 
34-20-5. Labor relations board—Offices—Jurisdiction—Member's par-
ticipation in case.—The principal office of the board shall be at the state 
capitol, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at any other 
place. The board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or 
agencies as it may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its func-
tions in any part of the state. A member who participates in such inquiry 
shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of 
the board in the same case. 
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34-20-6. Labor relations board—Rules and regulations.—The board shall 
have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
act. Such rules and regulations shall be effective upon publication in the 
manner in which the board shall prescribe. 
History: 0. 1953, 34-20-6, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 19. Labor RelationsC=>513. 
f)lA C.J.S. Labor Relations §517. 
34-20-7. Organization and collective bargaining—Employees' rights.— 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such em-
ployees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. 
His tory : C. 1953, 34-20-7, enacted by L. 48 Am. Jur . 2d 752, Labor and Labor 
1969, ch. 85, § 20. Relations §1198. 
Collective bargaining agreement. Construction and effect of termination 
Although there is an express provision and automatic renewal provisions in rol-
in the contract t ha t employer cannot dis- lectivc bargaining agreements, 17 A. L. R. 
charge an employee for lawful union ac- 2d 754. 
tivities, it is presumed tha t the par t ies do Continuance or termination of labor 
not intend to limit the common-law r ight union's s ta tus or authori ty as bargaining 
of the part ies to discharge or leave em- agent . 42 A. L. R. 2d 1415. 
ployment at the will of either, in the ab- Multi-employ»'r group as appropriate 
sence of an express provision or any pro- bargaining unit under Labor Relations 
vision in the agreement from which this Act, 12 A. L. R. 3d 805. 
can be implied. Held v. American Linen Right of individual ernplovee to enforce 
Supplv Co., 6 U. (2d) 106, 307 P . 2d 210. collective labor agreement* against em-
plover, 18 A. L. R. 2d 352. 
Union membership not a prerequisite. {{^h^ o f c o i I o i . t i v o :iCfion by employ-
Membership in the union is not a pre- ees as declared in § 7 of National Labor 
requisite to designat ing it as bargain ing Relations Act (20 I ' .S .C, § 157), *» A. L. R. 
agent. In ternat ional Union of Operat ing 2d 416. 
Engineers, Local No. 354 v. Industr ial Severabili ty of provisions in collectivo 
Comm. of Utah, 101 U. 139, 119 P. 2d 243. bargaining labor contracts , I I A. L. R. 2d 
S46. 
Collateral References. Subjects of mandatory collective bar-
Labor RelationsC=»171. gaining under Federal Labor Relations 
51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 148. Act, 12 A. L. R. 2d 265. 
34-20-8. Unfair labor practices.—(1) It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer, individually or in concert with others: 
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 34-20-7. 
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration 
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ; 
provided, that subject to rules and regulations made and published by 
the board pursuant to section 34-20-6, an employer shall not be prohibited 
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours 
without loss of time or pay. 
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 
any term of condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization; provided, that nothing in this act shall 
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preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organiza-
tion (not established, maintained or assisted by any action defined in this 
act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment, 
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the 
employees as provided in subsection 34-20-9 (1) in the appropriate col-
lective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made. 
(d) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of a 
majority of his employees in any collective bargaining uni t ; provided, that, 
when two or more labor organizations claim to represent a majority of 
the employees in the bargaining unit, the employer shall be free to file with 
the board a petition for investigation of certification of representatives and 
during the pendency of such proceedings the employer shall not be deemed 
to have refused to bargain. 
(e) To bargain collectively with the representatives of less than a 
majority of his employees in a collective bargaining unit. 
(f) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee he-
cause he has filed charges or given testimony under this act. 
(2) Tt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or 
in concert with others: 
(a) To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal 
rights, including those guaranteed in section 34-20-7, or to intimidate his 
family, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such em-
ployee or his family. 
(b) To coerce, intimidate or induce an employer to interfere wit); any 
of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those 
guaranteed in section 34-20-7, or to engage in any practice with regard to 
his employees which would constitute au unfair labor practice if under-
taken by him on his own initiative. 
(c) To co-operate in engaging in, promoting, or inducing picketing 
(not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free speech), 
boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless a majority in 
a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against whom 
such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a 
strike. 
(d) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, 
force, or coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employ-
ment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any 
place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and uninter-
rupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other 
ways of travel or conveyance. 
(e) To engage in a secondary boycott; or to hinder or prevent, by 
threats, intimidation, force, coercion, or sabotage, the obtaining, use or 
disposition of materials, equipment, or services; or to combine or conspire 
to hinder or prevent the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equip-
ment or services, provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent 
sympathetic strikes in support of those in similar occupations working for 
other employers in the same craft. 
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(f) To take unauthorized possession of property of flic employer. 
(3) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any person to do or cause 
to be done on behalf of or in the interest of employers or employees, or in 
connection with or to influence the outcome of any controversy as to em-
ployment relations, any act prohibited by subsection? (1) and (2) of this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-8, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 21. 
Cross-Heferences. 
Blacklisting forbidden, Const. Art. XI I , 
§ 19; 34-24-1. 
Exchange of blacklists prohibited, 
Uonst. Art. XVI, § 4 . 
Charitable inst i tut ions. 
Fact flint hospital is a nonprofit char-
itable institution does not exclude it from 
Utah Labor dela t ions Act; and where 
union has been certified as exclusive bar-
gain in g agent r*nr the employees and the 
labor relations board has ordered the hos-
pital to enter into collective bargaining 
with the union, the hospital is required 
to complv. Utah Labor Relations Board v. 
Utah VaUev Hospital, 120 U. 463, 235 P. 
2d 320, 2»? A. L. R. 2d 1012. 
Conflict of laws. 
Federal s ta tu te empowering National 
Labor Relations Board to cede i ts jurisdic-
tion over unfair labor practices affecting 
commerce to state agency, with certain 
exceptions, is the exclusive means where-
by stat'.s may a--t regarding matters which 
Congress has entrusted to the National 
Labor Relations Board; therefore, Utah 
h b o r relations board has no power to 
handle unfair labor charges within the 
jurisdiction of the national board where 
the national board has not ceded jurisdic-
tion to the Utah board, although the na-
tional board has declined to exercise its 
jurisdiction. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations 
Loard, 353 IT. S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 601, 77 S. Ct. 
598, reversing 5 U. (2d) 68, 2!>tS P. 2d 733. 
Federal legislation applies to labor-man-
agement relations in businesses involving 
interstate commerce and such federal leg-
islation prevails over s tate law when the 
two conflict, but the conflict must be def-
inite and irreconcilable. Utah Labor Re-
lations Board v. Utah Vallev Hospital, 120 
U. 463, 235 P. 1M 520, 2o A* L. R. 2d 1012. 
Peaceful picketing. 
Parking a car on a roadway near the 
company's road construction camp, placing 
a placard or banner on the car with the 
word "p icket" printed thereon, and with 
several men congregated about hailing 
approaching motorists and notifying them 
there is no work because of a labor dis-
pute is peaceful picketing and, therefore, 
cornea under the exception contained in 
parentheses in subsec. (2 ) (c ) as an exer-
cise of free speech. Internat ional Union 
of Operat ing Engineers, Local No. 3 v. 
Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 U. 183, 
203 P. 2d 404. 
Collateral References. 
Labor Re!ationsC=>3f»L 
51A U.J.S. Labor Nidations 8 32*. 
48 Am. Jur . 2d 377, Labor and Labor 
Relations § 539 et se<{. 
Discontinuance or suspension by employ-
er of" all or part of his operations, or lock-
out of emplovees, as unfair labor practice, 
20 A. L. 1?. 3d 403. 
Employer's decision to have work done 
by independent contractors rather than by 
emplovees as unfair labor practice, 6 A. 
L. R. 3d 11 IS. 
Period of limitations or laches to be ap-
plied under 21) U.S.C., §5$ 1S.">, 1*7. in action 
for brearh of labor contract, or damages 
from unfair labor practice, 19 A. L. R. 3d 
K>:H. 
Removal of ail or part of operations to 
new location as unfair labor practice, 5 
A. L. R. 3d 733. 
Request or demand for. or refusal of, 
transcription or recording of bargaining 
sessions or grievance negotiations as un-
fair labor practice, 24 A. L. R. 3d 70o*. 
Validity and construction of s tate stat-
utes making breath of a collective labor 
<*nn tract an unfair labor practice, 30 A. L. 
R. 3d 131. 
What consti tutes ''financial or other sup-
port" within $S ( a ) (2 ) [29 U.S.C.. § ]5S 
( a ) ( 2 ) ] making such support of a union an 
unfair labor practice, lu A. L. R. 3d Sol. 
Law Reviews. 
Labor Law—Unfair Labor Pract ices— 
lTnion Discipline of Supervisors Who Are 
Performing Rank-and-Filc Struck Work Is 
Xot an Unfair Labor Pract ice , 87 Harv . 
L. Rev. 458. 
34-20-9o Collective bargaining—Representatives—Powers of board.— 
(1) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective 
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bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in 
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rate of 
pay, wages, hours of employment, and of other conditions of employment, 
provided that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have 
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. 
(2) The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure 
to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to 
collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, 
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision of same. 
(3) Whenever a question affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly 
operation of industry arises concerning the representation of employees, 
the board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties in 
writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated 
or selected. Tn any such investigation, the board shall provide for an ap-
propriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a properdins 
under section 34-20-10, or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of 
employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representa-
tives. 
(4) Whenever an order of the board made pursuant to subsection 
34-20-10 (3) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an 
investigation pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, and there is a 
petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and 
the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the 
entire record required to be filed under subsections 34-20-10 (^ or 34-20-
10 (6), and thereupon the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or 
setting aside in whole or in part the order of the board shall be made and 
entered upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth in such 
transcript. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 34-20-9, enacted by L. *e,-tinn rela t ing to unfair labor prnctir<\s# 
1969, Ch. 85, § 22. Hotel Utah Co. v. Industr ia l r 0 n t m „ 116 
I r . 225, 209 P. 2d 235. 
Construction and application. _ , . . . .A Al , .. -
The s ta tu te permit* the selection of a 
Former suhsec. ( c ) , present subsec. (3) barga in ing representat ive bv anv suitr.ble 
of this section is practically identical
 m ( . r h o , ^ a n d t h e ]Cgis1ature*bas 'given the 
with a section of Wagner Act and, there- i i r n r ( | t n „ r o v , r r t o :^ccrf:]\n the will of 
fore, in terpreta t ion given by federal
 t n e ninjoritv of a given group of cmplov-
.ou r t s is considered. Southeast Furn i tu re
 fMtQ b v m r n n s o t n o r than an election. Hotel 
Co. v. Indust r ia l Comm., 100 U. 154, 111 r t a h ' C o . v. Industr ia l Cnnim., 116 V. 443, 
P
-
 2 d 1 5 3
- 211 P. 2d 200, affirming 116 U. 225, 209 P. 
Industr ia l beard can only mnke an or- 2d 235. 
der des ignat ing barga in ing agent under 
this section and is without power to enter Appeal and review. 
addit ional order compelling employer to Orders made under this section are not 
bargain with the named agent as this mav appealable, but when an order is made un-
only be done af ter a proper complaint <]er u n f a i r labor pract ices section, 34-20-
eharging unfair labor practices is filed. m . and properlv appealed, the court mav 
Southeast Furn i tu re Co. v. Indust r ia l properlv ronsidcr and review the order en-
fomm., 100 U. 154. H I P . 2d 153.
 t o r C ( j x;nt\VT t n i s a c t i o n with the final or. 
T'nder this section the legislature did <Vr issued under the other. Southeast 
not intend to require the same formality Furni ture Co. v. Industr ia l Comm., 100 \\ 
in hearings and pleadings that it did in 154, 111 P. 2d 153. 
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Jurisdiction. 
Utah industrial commission docs not 
have jurisdiction to ascertain, determine 
or certify the collective bargaining repre-
sentative of employees of corporation 
whose business effects commerce as de-
fined by subds. (6) and (7) , sec. *J, of the 
National Labor Relations Act. National 
Labor Relations Board v. Industr ia l 
Comm. of S ta te of Utah, S4 F . Supp. 593. 
Union membership not a prerequisite. 
Membership in the union is not a pre-
requisite to designating it as barga in ing 
agent. In ternat ional Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local No. 35^ v. Industr ia l 
Comm. of Utah, 101 U. 139, 119 P . 2d 243. 
Collateral References. 
Labor RclationsC=>191. 
Zi C.J.S. Labor Relations § 10*2. 
48 Am. Jur . 2d 319, Labor and Labor 
Relations § 438 et seq. 
34-20-10. Unfair labor practices—Powers of board to prevent—Proce-
dure—Review.—(1) The board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to 
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice, as listed in 
section 34-20-8, affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of 
industry. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any 
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established 
by agreement, code, law or otherwise. 
(2) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is 
engaged in any such unfair labor practice, the board, or any agent or 
agency designated by the board for such purposes, shall have power to 
issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the 
charges in that respect and containing a notice of hearing before the 
board or a member of it, or before a designated agent or agency at a 
place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of the 
complaint. Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or 
agency conducting the hearing or the board in its discretion at any time 
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained 
of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended com-
plaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the 
place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, 
agent or agency conducting the hearing or the board, any other person 
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testi-
mony. In any such proceeding the rules of evidence prevailing in courts 
of law or equity shall be controlling. 
(3) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the 
board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the board. Thereafter, in 
its discretion, the board upon notice may take further testimony or hear 
argument. If upon all the testimony taken the board shall be of the 
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engag-
ing in any such unfair labor practice, then the board shall state its findings 
Combination of separate plants or units 
of .same employer as single bargaining 
unit, 12 A. L. R.":M 787. 
Duty of furnishing information to ein-
p!o\ee representat ives, under National La-
bor Relations Acts, 2 A. L. U. 3d 880. 
Effect of alleged misstatements or mis-
representations in campaign l i terature, 
material , or leaflets on validi ty of repre-
sentation election, 3 A. L. R. 3d 8S9. 
Multi-employer group as appropriate 
bargain ing unit under Labor Relations 
Act, 12 A. L. K. 3d S0."3. 
Rights of collective action by employ-
ees as declared in § 7 of National Labor 
Kelations Act (29 U.S.C., § 157), 6 A. U It. 
1M 41(3. 
Union's representations concerning initi-
ation t i e s or dues as affecting its s ta tus as 
bargaining representat ive, 13 A. L. R. 3d 
990. 
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of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person ait order 
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and to take such 
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without 
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this act. Such order may 
further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the 
extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon all the testimony 
taken the board shall be of the opinion that no person named in the com-
plaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then 
the board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing 
the complaint. 
(4) Until a transcript of the record in a case shall have been filed in 
a court, as hereinafter provided, the board may at any time, upon reasonable 
notice and in such manner as it may deem proper, modify or set aside, 
in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it. 
(5) The board shall have power to petition the Supreme Court of 
Utah for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary 
relief or restraining order and shall certify and file in the court a tran-
script of the entire record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and 
testimony upon which such order was entered and the findings and order 
of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be 
served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the 
proceeding and of the question determined therein and shall have power 
to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and 
proper and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and pro-
ceedings set forth in such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and 
enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order 
of the board. No objection that has not been urged before the board, its 
member, agent or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the 
failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 
extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the board as to the facts, 
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply 
to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to 
the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and 
that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence 
in the hearing before the board, its member, agent or agency, the court may 
order such additional evidence to be taken before the board, its member, 
agent or agency, and to be made part of the transcript. The board may 
modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of 
additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or 
new findings, which, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, and shall 
file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its 
original order. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be exclusive and 
its judgment and decree shall be final. 
(6) Any person aggrieved by a final order, the board grauting or 
denying in whole or in part the relief sought, may obtain a review of 
such order in the Supreme Court of Utah by filing in such court a written 
petition praying that the order of the board be modified or set aside. A 
copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the board, and the 
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ggrieved party shall file in tlie court a transcript of tlie entire record 
u tlie proceeding, certified by the board, including tlie pleading and testi-
mony upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings 
ind order of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same 
nanner as in the case of an application by the board under subsection (5) 
)f this section and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to 
,he board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just 
md proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, 
modifying' and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in 
part the order of the board; and the findings of the board as to the facts, 
if supported by evidence, shall in like manner be conclusive. 
(7) The commencement of proceedings under subsections (5) or (6) 
of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as 
a stay of the board's order. 
(8) Petitions filed under this act shall be heard expeditiously, and 
if possible within ten days after they have been docketed. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-10, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 23. 
Construction and application. 
Much of the former section is derived 
from a similar section of the Wagner Act ; 
therefore, interpretat ion by federal courts 
of this and other similar sections is con-
sidered. Southeast Furn i ture Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 100 U. 134, 111 P . 2d 153. 
To compel an employer to bargain with 
agent designated according to former sec-
tion 34-1-9, present 34-20-9, board must 
await charge of unfair practices and fil-
ing of complaint under this section, and 
cannot short circuit procedure by ordering 
employer to bargain with agent at time of 
designation. Southeast Furn i ture Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 100 U. 154, 111 P . 2d 
153. 
Utah labor relations board is a creature 
of s ta tute and any action brought by it 
against an employer is a special one 
brought under a s ta tutory provision; there 
is no presumption of jurisdiction. Fur-
breeders Agricultural Coup. v. Wiesley, 102 
U. 601, 132 P. 2d 334. 
I t is sufficient compliance with require-
ments of this section tha t the board's find-
ings state an ult imate fact, the discharge 
of employee for union activit ies. The 
board, an adminis t ra t ive body, may con-
clude, based on that finding, that defend-
ant indulged in an unfair labor practice. 
Teamsters Local Union Xo. 222 v. Strevell-
Paterson Hardware Co., 110 U. 388, 174 P. 
2d 164. 
Appeal and review. 
Orders made under this section are ap-
pealable, while those made under former 
section 34-1-9, present 34-20-9, are not; 
however, when an order made pursuant to 
this section is properly before a court for 
review, the court may consider the board's 
action under both. Southeast Furn i ture Co. 
v. Industr ial Comm., 1<»<> U. 154, 111 P. 2d 
153. 
Evidence. 
Sta te labor relations bo.-nl is not a 
court but primarily a fact-finding commis-
sion; its findings must be based on and 
supported by competent, material , and rele-
vant evidence. Building Service Employees 
Local Xo. 59 v. Xewhouse Realty Co., 97 
U. 502, 95 P. 2d 507. 
Although the rules of evidence which 
prevail in courts of law or equity are not 
applicable to hearings before the labor 
relations board, the material facts relied 
on to support the orders must be reasona-
bly inferable from the evidence, and the 
procedure adopted by the board must af-
ford all part ies a reasonable opportunity 
to present their evidence. Utah Labor Re-
lations Board v. Broadway Shoe Repair-
ing Co., 120 U. ZS3, 230 P. 2d 1072. 
Collateral References. 
Labor RelationsC=390. 
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 32*. 
48 Am. Jur . 2d 730, Labor and Labor 
Relations S 1171. 
Enforcement of labor board's order 
against emplover's successors, assigns, or 
the like, 46 A. L. R. 2d 592. 
Jurisdict ion of Nat ional Labor Rela-
tions Board over branch plant or separate 
depar tment engaged in in t ras ta te opera-
tions, where owner is engaged in inter-
s tate commerce in other plants or depart-
ments, 23 A. L. R. 2d 893. 
State 's power to enjoin violation of col-
lective labor contract as affected by Fed-
eral Labor Relations Acts, 32 A. L. R. 
2d S29. 
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34-20-11. Hearings and investigations—Power of board—Witnesses— 
Procedure.—For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in 
the opinion of the board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of 
the powers vested in it by sections 34-20-9 and 34-20-10: 
(1) The board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all 
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the 
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded 
against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. Any 
member of the board shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence 
that relates to any matter under investigation or in question, before the 
board, its member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or investigation. 
Any member of the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board, 
for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine wit-
nesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the produc-
tion of such evidence may be required from any place in the state at any 
duly designated place of hearing. 
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any 
person, any district court of Utah within the jurisdiction of which the 
inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person 
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts 
business upon application by the board shall have jurisdiction to issue to 
such person an order requiring such person to appear before the board, 
its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or 
there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in 
question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished 
by said court as a contempt thereof. 
(3) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from 
producing books, records, correspondence, documents or other evidence 
in obedience to the subpoena of the board on the ground that the testimony 
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him 
to a penalty or forfeiture, but no individual shall be prosecuted or sub-
jected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, 
matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed 
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, 
except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecu-
tion and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. 
(4) Complaints, orders, and other processes and papers of the board, 
its member, agent, or agency, may be served either personally, by certified 
or registered mail, by telegraph, or by leaving a copy thereof at the 
principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. 
The verified return by the individual so serving the same setting forth 
the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the return 
post-office receipt or telegram receipt therefor when certified or registered 
and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. 
Witnesses summoned before the board, its member, agent, or agency, shall 
be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of 
the state, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons 
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taking the same sliall severally be entitled to the same fees as arc paid 
for like services in the courts of the state. 
(5) The several departments and agencies of the state when directed 
by the governor shall furnish the board, upon its request, all records, 
papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before 
the board. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-11, enacted by 51AC.J .S . Labor Relations § ri!)<*. 
L. 1969, ell. 85, § 24. 48 Am. Jur . 2d 73(5, Labor and Labor 
Relations § 1171 et scq. 
Collateral References. 
Labor Rtdatioii5>C=3521. 
34-20-12. Willful interference—Penalty.—Any person who shall will-
fully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with any member of the board, or 
any of its agents or agencies, in the performance of duties pursuant to 
this act shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or both. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-12, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 85, § 25. 
34-20-13. Right to strike.—Nothing in this act shall be construed so 
as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. 
History: C. 1953, 34-20-13, enacted by Eligibii i tv of Mrikeis to obtain public 
L. 1969, ch. 85, §26. asMbtanee, 37 A. L. K. 3d 1303. 
Labor law: ri^ht of public employees to 
Collateral References. s t r ike or engage in work stoppage, 37 
Labor RelationsC=>365. A. L. "R. 3d 1147. 
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 331. Riijlit of labor union to strike, picket, or 
48 Am. Jur . 2d 846, Labor and Labor impose boycott to compel payment by em-




Section 34-21-1. Repealed. 
34-21-2. Eight-hour day—Smelters, mines and related industr ies—Exceptions. 
34-21-1. Repealed. 
Repeal. works and in penal insti tutions, was re-
Section 34-21-1 (L. 1969, ch. 85, § 2 7 ) , pealed by Laws 1971, ch. 73, § 1 1 . For 
relating to the eight-hour day on public present provisions, &ee 34-30-8. 
34-21-2, Eight-hour day—Smelters, mines and related industries—Ex-
ceptions.—The period of employment of working men in smelters and all 
other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals, shall be 
eight hours per day, but work in excess of eight hours per day will not 
constitute a violation of the provisions of this section if the industrial com-
mission certifies in writing to an employer that such work in the employer's 
institutions is not detrimental to the life, health, safety and welfare of 
the working men. Such certification shall not issue unless interested parties 
have been afforded an opportunity to present to the industrial commission 
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